Originally written December 4th, 2020.
While the modern Canadian Armed Forces are a different entity than the British forces, they certainly do take a number of traditions, tactics, and other things from them. There are of course differences, these could even be seen in the pre-Confederation era. These changes came gradually. This was not an easy process, the only North American forces for the majority of this period were militia, meaning that they were not seen to be as capable as their regular counterparts and would at times be employed in ways that they were not suited for, but at the same time glorified by the local population as the only defenders of Canada. However, the mother countries would gradually expect the colonies to take on more and more of the burden of defence, as it was both costly and prevented resources from being used elsewhere. During colonial rule, this largely was as the role of the militia, which would make Canada reluctant to take on more of the responsibility for her own defence. It is of course not only the British that has influenced Canadian military history but also the French, prior to the conquest of New France. There will be two main periods that will be looked at: New France, up in till the end of the Seven Years War, and British North America, from the Conquest to Confederation.
While the New France period focuses mostly on the French, the British were still key players at this time. The main goals of the French were trade and defence from the British and their native allies. Once in control, the British soon had to worry about the new threat that was growing in the form of the United States, this would gradually change to a desire to have Canada take over her own defence, as it had become very costly.
Origins
Prior to European contact, warfare, as it was known in other parts of the world, was unknown in North America. The technologies of gun powder were not known, nor was the concept of large, uniformed Armies. These technologies and customs were brought to North America by the British, French, and others, but they could not be used in the same way. The landscape was largely forested with little settlement and no roads. It would be a long time before there were sizeable armies with which European style battles could be fought, and even at that point, the engagements would be much more crucial. Any reinforcements from the regular army would be on the other side of the ocean. These differences made it necessary to fight differently, something that was adapted easily by the militia but would be more difficult for the regulars to conform to. These different tactics led to disaster for the French at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham when their lines broke because the militia fell to the ground to reload.
Canada would be reluctant to take on significant defence duties of her own as these had been traditionally provided by Britain and augmented by Canadians in times of war or rebellion. The militia myth, which shall be looked at in more depth, caused Canadians to feel that defence could be left up to militia in wartime. Perhaps this is one contributing factor to Canada being largely unprepared for most of the wars that Canada has fought in. While the militia here that is spoken of during colonial times was largely a force of citizen-soldiers who had a wide variety of training and experience; there should be great caution taken in comparing them to the modern professional reserve force.
New France
While there had been informal militia formed in response to Iroquois actions, the militia of New France was not formally authorized in till 1669 and would not begin to form in till 1673. All male inhabitants between the ages of 16 and 60 were liable for service.[1] While enrolling in the Militia was mandatory, service itself was not. The Militia at this point was also used to transport supplies to the regular army by various means, including canoes. While the Regulars and the Militia were two very unique elements, there was a continuous supply of former regulars who had been discharged in New France, bringing many traditions from the regular army with them. The early militia would develop its own style of fighting, similar to the natives. Because of the small population of the country, they could not afford the casualties that would result from big battles, and as such were able to use their knowledge of the wilderness and ability to live off the land to make sudden strikes at the enemy and withdraw before being counter attacked.[2]
The exception to the statement that the majority of North Americans were militia in this period was the Troupes de la Marine. While the Troupes de la Marines were initially drawn from France, it was not a popular commission for an officer to take as there was little chance for promotion beyond Captain. Citizens of New France were more than willing to receive commissions in the Marines, they would also end up providing significant numbers of men to the ranks as well.[3]
While the French officers might not have felt that the militia was not the most disciplined, they did however recognise the populations’ willingness to serve. This was very much in contrast to the average French citizen. It was perhaps necessary that in the face of the Iroquois and British that necessity developed this ethos of service.
The militia’s conduct in battle should also be addressed. There were considerable difficulties integrating the militia with the regulars, especially considering how the militia resorted to lying on the ground to reload during the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, which resulted in the battalions being broken up.[4] Even after the efforts that were made by the French Sergeants to try and force the militia to their feet, some historians ultimately blame the militia for the line being broken before the British even fire their first volley.[5] The militia are themselves not to be faulted that they were employed in a way that was not suited to them. This is far from the only blunder that occurred on the French side that day, as Montcalm rushed into battle believing that his enemy was not ready, instead of waiting for reinforcements before meeting the British who had by the way of their movements cut themselves off up the river from the city of Quebec.
It should also be noted that many, including the French Government considered New France to have already been lost by this point.[6] However, there are references in letters from French Officers prior to the battle that appears very optimistic that they will hold the city. The French also misinterpreted the British preparations to attack, as preparations to depart and abandon the campaign.[7] It should be noted, however, that the French General, the Marquis de Montcalm did not believe that the city could be saved. It can be seen in letters he wrote to other officers, Levis and the Chevalier Bourlamaque, and the fact that he had planned an elaborate retreat into Louisiana, which he recorded in a memoir in 1758.[8] There are also letters between British officers after the victory to show that the British did not expect to be able to take the city.[9]
British North America
The British did recruit regulars in North America, namely the 60th Royal American Regiment of Foot which was raised in 1755. However, there was considerably more militia that was raised. One of the most celebrated groups of British Militia of this period was the Rangers. The Rangers were primarily used for fighting in the wilderness, similar to how the French militia was used. The Rangers however were not militia, nor were they members of the British Army, although their officers held British Army commissions. They were funded and paid by the Crown. They were largely effective against the French, but they had somewhat of a rough reputation, partially because the British saw them as undisciplined.[10]
While the sun never set on the British Empire under Queen Victoria, it certainly did not do it without cost. The vast expanses of defending the vast empire was a burden on Britain, leaving many to want to look for a way to reduce overseas forces. Due to better relations with the United States in the late 1840s and early 1850s, Britain would reduce troops to 4960 in the Province of Canada.[11]
Confederation would reinforce the need for a strong Canadian force. While the 1868 Militia Act did not enforce conscription but called for a volunteer force of 40,000 militia, referred to as the Active Militia. This would be increased to 45,000 three years later. There was also a Reserve Militia, which included every able man between the ages of 18 and 60.[12] While these numbers look good on paper, they were hard to realize in reality. After the Fenian Raids were over there was little public interest in the militia. Some employers even fired employees for attending training. There was difficultly in finding recruits to fill the ranks.[13]
When the British regulars left Canada after Confederation, there were almost no regular forces. The attitude had been in the Canada’s that defence was the responsibility of Britain and that the only service that was necessary by the colonials was in the time of emergencies. The militia myth helped to make Canadians believe that a militia formed in wartime would be sufficient in the event of war.[14] The militia myth has come not only from the War of 1812, but also from the New France period. In the case of the French, the militia myth has often been used by Quebec Nationalists for their own purposes. At this point, officer commissions were largely based on politics and did not require previous military service.
During the American Civil War, due to the shortage of officers, military schools were founded that were funded by Canada, but staffed by Britain. The courses offered at these schools were short to begin with, only three months long. By the time of Confederation, there were four of these military schools in Quebec City, Montreal, Kingston, and Toronto. A school of calvary was formed in Toronto and a school for artillery in Montreal. The next year two more were opened in Saint John and Halifax. When the British regulars were withdrawn in 1870, so too were the staff at the schools, meaning that this responsibility too was passed onto Canada. The first regular Canadian troops were two Batteries of Artillery at Kingston and Quebec because the instruction was too technical to leave to the militia, and it was necessary to have full-time staff to maintain the guns.[15]
Conclusion
The presence of French and British forces in Canada has significantly influenced the present-day Canadian Armed Forces. They helped Canada develop many military tactics and military identity. During the time of French and British colonial rule, this largely was seen as the role of the militia. It can perhaps be said that this continued to a certain degree right up in till the Cold War as Canada did not maintain a large regular force in till this time. The militia identity that was glorified during the War of 1812, perhaps is one of many reasons why Canada was reluctant to take on more of a serious role in her own defence, which has had had consequences as Canada has largely been reactionary in military matters ever since.
[1] G.F.G. Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers, 1604-1954: The Military History of An Unmilitary People, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1954), 21-22.
[2] Stanley, 23-24.
[3] Stanley, 25-27.
[4] Jay Cassel, The Militia Legend: Canadians at War, 1665-1760, in Yves Tremblay, Canadian Military History Since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2001), p. 64.
[5]Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada. 5th Ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007), p. 37.
[6] Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 217-220.
[7] William J. Eccles, Essays on New France (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), 125.
[8] Eccles, 127.
[9] Eccles, 127.
[10] C.P Stacey, “The British Forces in North America during the Seven Years’ War, “in The Dictionary of Canadian Biography vol 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), xxvii-xxviii.
[11] C.P. Stacey, Canada and the British Army: A Study in the Practice of Responsible Government (London: Longmans, 1936), 85.
[12] Stanley, 234.
[13] Morton, 94.
[14] Richard A. Preston, Canada’s RMC: A History of the Royal Military College of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 6.
[15] Preston, 6-10.
January 11th, 2022
My Corner of the Internet 